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International Law and Legitimacy and
the Palestine Question
By RASHID KHALIDI
It is a great honor to be invited to give the Fourth Annual Rudolf
B. Schlesinger Memorial Lecture at the University of California,
Hastings College of the Law. It is a particular honor, inasmuch as I
am neither a practitioner of the law, nor an expert of any kind in
regard to legal matters. My daughter is a law student, however, for
what that is worth! That non sequitur aside, what I propose to speak
about today is not international law per se, but rather something I do
know something about, specifically aspects of the history of how
international law and the growing 20th century framework of
international legitimacy emerging from the League of Nations and
the United Nations have intersected with the issue of Palestine over
the past century or so.
My interest in this topic grew out of the research I began over a
decade ago for my just-published book, The Iron Cage: The Story of
the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood This book deals with the
question of why the Palestinian people, in spite of a well-developed
sense of national identity, and levels of social and economic
development at least as high as their Arab neighbors, were
nevertheless unsuccessful in achieving statehood and independence
throughout the course of the 20th century, and into the present
century. The conclusions of my book focus mainly on internal
Palestinian causes for this failure. I nevertheless give attention to the
externally imposed 'constraints that have operated on the Palestinians
since the end of the Ottoman era in their country in 1918 and down to
the present. Indeed, the inexorably binding nature of these
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constraints is what suggested to me the main title of my book, The
Iron Cage.
In the course of my research, it became apparent to me that
among the most important of these constraints on the Palestinians
were international ones, and that these emanated from two of the
pillars of the modern international order, and of international
legitimacy, specifically the League of Nations and the United Nations.
Indeed, in some measure, the treatment of the Palestine issue by
these two bodies has shown the limits of international law, and of an
international order founded on it.
Moreover, the case of Palestine illustrates strikingly the long-
term perils and pitfalls of great powers following shortsighted policies
that are not based on their own professed principles, and that are not
consonant with international law and legitimacy. This was just as true
during the many decades during which Britain dominated the Middle
East, as it has been of the more than half a century since then, during
which time the United States has been the preeminent power in that
region.
Let me explain briefly. Towards the end of World War I, Britain
and France sought to obtain compensation in the form of colonial
expansion for their huge losses during the course of the war. Part of
this compensation was to be in the form of a partition between them
and other allied belligerents of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman
Empire. However, as the war ended, Britain and France found
themselves to be heavily dependent on the military, naval and
economic contributions of the United States. This obliged them to
accept, at least ostensibly, the American war aims enunciated by
President Wilson in December 1917 in the form of the 14 Points.
These included the idea of a world body to regulate international
affairs, and the principle of self-determination. These two ideas were
the germ of the League of Nations and its Mandate system, which
when applied to the Middle East obliged these two colonial powers to
mask their territorial ambitions in that region behind a Mandatory
framework.
The terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which
established the Mandates, were clear insofar as these Arab regions
that had formerly been part of the Ottoman Empire were concerned.
According to the Covenant, they were to be under a Class A
Mandate, meaning that they had "reached a state of development
where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally
recognized." This independence was to be subject only to the
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rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory
power.
In fact, however, long before Wilson enunciated his 14 Points,
the British in 1915 had already promised the Arabs independence in
an ill-defined area as part of an ambiguous correspondence with an
Arab potentate, Sharif Husayn of Mecca, promises that were later
repeated several times by the British. At about the same time,
Britain and France had secretly agreed to partition the Arab
provinces between them, under the Sykes-Picot accords. Thereafter,
in the Balfour Declaration of November 1917, Britain promised to
support the establishment of a "Jewish national home" in Palestine.
This led to the not entirely unfounded charge that Palestine was a
"thrice-promised land." Great Britain eventually decided to achieve
its long-standing strategic ambitions in Palestine through support of
Zionism. In consequence, it constructed a mandatory regime for
Palestine that was in direct contravention of the Covenant of the
League of Nations and of its various World War I pledges of
independence to the Arabs.
Specifically, this Mandatory regime in Palestine provided no
scope whatsoever for treating the Palestinian Arabs, who formed over
90% of the population, as an "independent nation," the manner in
which the Iraqis, Trans-Jordanians, Syrians and Lebanese in a similar
position were treated under the Mandate system. Indeed, the words
"Arab" and "Palestinian" never occur in the text of the Mandate,
adopted in July 1922: the overwhelming Arab majority of the
population are simply described as "non-Jewish communities in
Palestine," or as religious communities, Muslims and Christians, who
are to have "civil and religious rights," but no political or national
ones. Nor does the text of the Mandate provide for any constitutional
institutions or organs of self-government for the population as a
whole or for the Arab majority, nor were such institutions or organs
ever created by the British. By contrast, in the Mandate, the tiny
Jewish minority is described as a people with national rights, and the
Mandatory power is enjoined in six of the document's 28 articles to
act in support of the project to create a Jewish national home in
Palestine, including creating representative institutions and a
diplomatic agency, and facilitating immigration and land acquisition.
For decades, Britain twisted and turned as a result of conflicting
pressures between the contradictory poles of respect for the principle
of self-determination that it had formally accepted and that was
embodied in the League of Nations Covenant, and faithfulness to its
20071
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commitment to create a Jewish national home while denying
Palestinian national rights, as embodied in the Mandate for Palestine.
Until the very end of the Mandate, in 1939 on the eve of World War
II, however, there was never any question that the commitment to
Zionism was the stronger. Over these crucial decades from 1917 until
1939, Great Britain enabled the Zionists to create the demographic,
economic and strategic springboard from which they were ultimately
able to take over the entire country at the expense of its indigenous
population. It thereby helped significantly to produce a conflict that
only became more bitterly intractable as time went on.
In other words, this was a case where the post-World War I era
community of nations, its will expressed through the League of
Nations Covenant, enunciated a principle (that was much later taken
up in the Charter of the United Nations), that of support for national
self-determination. But that same body, driven by the ambitions of
its most powerful member-state, Great Britain, contradicted that
principle insofar as the Arab majority population of Palestine was
concerned in the Mandate it later drew up for that country. While
many blame the conflict that thereafter tore that sad land apart
entirely on the Arabs or the Zionists, with perhaps some blame
attached to Britain, it is clear that at least some of the blame should
be affixed to the international community. Specifically, in Palestine,
the League of Nations failed to abide by one of its own basic
principles, self-determination, under the pressure of the greatest of
the great powers that dominated the League. Britain's agonizingly
slow, painful and humiliating withdrawal from Palestine in 1947-48,
covered in opprobrium by both Arabs and Jews, should stand as a
warning against even the greatest of powers flouting the principles of
international law and legitimacy, although it took many decades for
the penalty for these departures from principle to catch up with the
British.
Among the first major issues that were referred to the new
United Nations after World War II was the question of Palestine.
The Charter of the United Nations reprised the respect for the
principle of self-determination embodied in the League of Nations
Charter. The United Nations made the application of this principle
universal, in distinction to the League, which had never applied the
principle to the pre-World War I colonial possessions of the
victorious allied powers, but only to Eastern and Central Europe, the
Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and a few other former
German colonial possessions (although the latter were in a lower and
[Vol. 30:2
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less privileged category than were supposed to be Palestine and other
Arab lands).
This new commitment to universality (seen also in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other documents that provide us
with the framework of the modern international order) reflected the
greater number of independent states that were part of the United
Nations, as well as powerful world-wide aspirations among colonized
peoples for independence and self-determination. However, it also
reflected something far less idealistic and altruistic: this was the
determination of the powers which now dominated the international
system, the United States and the USSR, to fragment the colonial
empires of the old European great powers, thereby making possible
the extension of their own influence into new regions of the world.
This powerful combination of forces: idealism, aspirations for
freedom, and cynical super-power realpolitik, provided an irresistible
solvent that rapidly dissolved the bonds holding together the great
colonial empires. Within a little more than a generation after World
War II, these empires were a thing of the past.
In the case of Palestine, this new dispensation operated
according to form. In its disposition of Palestine, the United Nations
General Assembly, in its Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947, at
least paid lip service to the principle of self-determination for both
peoples, Jewish and Arab. Unlike the League of Nations Mandate of
25 years earlier, the Partition Resolution, which was based on the
majority report of the UN Special Commission on Palestine
(UNSCOP), acknowledged that there was an Arab people in
Palestine, and called for a state for this people. However, under
General Assembly Resolution 181, the Arabs, who formed over 65%
of the population, were to get a state in only 45% of the country,
excluding much of its richest land, and placing huge amounts of Arab
property, and nearly as many Arabs as Jews, in the Jewish state which
was to be created in the remaining,55% of the country.
The basic reason for this imbalance was simple: World War II
had not solely simply been a war like World War I in which the
victors shaped a new international order. It also represented a new
form of inhumanity, in the form of genocidal policies by the defeated
Nazi regime against whole categories of individuals, most notably the
Jews in the form of the Holocaust. In response to this new level of
barbarism, the victors had not only created the United Nations, but
also the Nuremburg Tribunals and a whole body of new principles
which have since become central to international law and legitimacy.
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It was the unlucky fate of the Palestinian Arabs to be in conflict with
a people who were the primary victims of the worst of these crimes.
This inequitable disposition of the question of Palestine by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1947, with the full support of all the
great powers, reflected their sympathy and that of the international
community for these victims, even though this resulted in a further
injustice, and the creation of a new class of victims, the Palestinian
Arabs.
Although the United States and the other great powers voted in
the General Assembly in November 1947 for the creation of an Arab
state in Palestine alongside a Jewish one, all of them acquiesced in the
extinction of that Arab state before its birth. This was the result of
the combined clandestine and overt efforts of the new state of Israel,
together with Britain and Jordan. These powers acted on the basis of
two confidential understandings, one between the Jewish Agency
(precursor of the Israeli government) and Trans-Jordan, and the
other between Great Britain and Trans-Jordan, which have been
revealed over the past two decades by the research of several
prominent historians, Israeli, British and American. Thus in regard
to the creation of an Arab state in Palestine, the United Nations
General Assembly took a decision, and did nothing to see to it that it
was carried out.
Two other points are worth making about the responsibility of
the United Nations (in addition to that of all the other parties) for the
tragedies that ensued for the Palestinians. The first is that the
proposal to partition Palestine in 1948 was not made in a vacuum. In
addition to the Majority Report that was the basis for the partition
resolution, there was also a Minority Report of UNSCOP, which
presciently warned against the bloodshed and strife that would
necessarily follow implementation of a resolution to give most of a
country to a minority of its population, and warned that such an
action might precipitate a long-lasting conflict. The General
Assembly saw fit to ignore these warnings. It also failed to provide
peace-keeping forces, or any other mechanism to ensure that the
resolution was respected, and to regulate the ensuing conflict, until it
was much too late. These were failings of the international
community as a whole, on top of the failures of individual states. And
while we can ascribe responsibility to many states, and to several of
the great powers, it is the power that already was becoming the
world's greatest, the United States, that bears a special share of
responsibility for this result, and for its aftermath.
[Vol. 30:2
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Thereafter, the United States repeatedly sponsored or supported
measures in the United Nations or on its own that might have
alleviated the conflict. These ranged from General Assembly
Resolution 194 of December 1948, which would have allowed the
return of Palestinian refugees to their homes and compensated them
for their losses, to the efforts of the Palestine Conciliation
Commission of 1949, established by the United Nations General
Assembly. Nothing ultimately came of either of these efforts, leaving
the refugees where they were, and leaving the conflict unsettled until
this day. Much later, after the 1967 war, measures championed by the
United States included Security Council Resolution 242, which laid
down a basis ultimately agreed to by all the parties for resolution of
the conflict. They continued through a variety of essentially
unilateral American initiatives toward peace, from Kissinger's shuttle
diplomacy of 1973-76, resulting in several lasting agreements between
the parties, to President Carter's efforts at Camp David that produced
an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and James Baker's convening of the
1991 Madrid Peace Conference, which eventually resulted in a
Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty.
In all of these cases, however, whatever its declared policy, the
United States never unequivocally and in practice supported the self-
determination and independent, viable statehood of the Palestinians.
Indeed, it often acted to undermine this and other universal principles
of international law and legitimacy. Without these principles, a just
and lasting resolution of this problem is impossible. Even while
declaring support for Palestinian statehood in 2005, President Bush
had previously undermined the very principle he was enunciating in a
letter in April 2004 to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. President
Bush asserted that Israel's settlement blocs were "realities," and that
Palestinian refugees could not return to Israel in any peace
settlement.
It is worth dwelling for a moment on the significance of the
agreement the two men reached in 2004. In accepting that Israel had
the right to annex the considerable areas of the West Bank occupied
in 1967, where the largest of its illegal settlements are located, the
President departed significantly from the policy of six previous
American administrations. Basing itself on the United Nations
Charter, the United States has always maintained since 1967 that
Israeli settlements were illegal, and were an "obstacle to peace."
With one stroke, the Bush Administration discarded one of the core
principles of the internationally recognized basis for Arab-Israeli
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peace making, Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967: that principle
is the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. Now, the
settlements were described by the President as "realities" that will
have to be taken into account in any agreement.
In making policy on Palestine over most of the past century,
leaders in buth Britain and thea T Tnite.d States were driven primarily
by powerful strategic and domestic political considerations, rather
than by principle. The strategic considerations included the goals of
dominating this crucial piece of territory, keeping it in friendly hands,
and denying it to others. The political ones included cold calculations
of the considerable domestic electoral and other advantages to be
obtained from supporting Zionism and later Israel, as against the
negligible domestic political costs. There also existed naive sympathy
for Zionism among many British and American politicians, based on
a particularly Protestant immersion in the Bible. This sympathy was
often combined with a laudable desire to make amends for the
persecution of the Jews in different parts of Europe (often combined
with a less laudable, indeed reprehensible, desire to have the victims
of persecution find haven somewhere other than Great Britain or the
United States during the 1930s). The result of such attitudes, which
necessarily ignored or downplayed vital realities on the ground in
Palestine, has been an enduring tragedy.
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